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FOREWORD V
The Debris Team has developed and implemented measures to control damage from debris in the
Shuttle operational environment and to make the control measures a part of routine launch flows.
These measures include engineering surveillance during vehicle processing and closeout
operations, facility and flight hardware inspections before and after launch, and photographic
analysis of mission events.
Photographic analyses of mission imagery from launch, on-orbit, and landing provide significant
data in verifying proper operation of systems and evaluating anomalies. In addition to the
Kennedy Space Center Photo/Video Analysis, reports from Johnson Space Center and Marshall
Sp.ace Flight Center are also included in this document to provide an integrated assessment of the
mlSslon.
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Photo 1 : Launch of ShuttleMission STS-63
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z1.0 SUMMARY
A pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle was performed on 1 February 1995.
The detailed walkdown of Launch Pad 39B and MLP-2 also included the STS-63 primary flight
elements OV-103 Discovery (20th flight), ET-68 (LWT 61), and BI-070 SRB's. Loose thermal
curtain tape on the right SRB was the only vehicle anomaly. Four facility debris items were
documented for resolution prior to ET cryoload.
The planned launch on 2 February 1995 was scrubbed for 24 hours due to the failure of an Orbiter
Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU). The problem was detected prior to cryogenic loading.
The vehicle was cryoloaded on 2 February 1995. There were no Launch Commit Criteria (LCC),
OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria violations. No IPR's were taken. Due to the ambient weather
conditions at this time of year, the potential existed for acreage icing. Frost, but no detectable ice,
formed on the +Y side of the External Tank during the countdown. There were no protuberance
icing conditions outside of the established data base.
Minor damage to the ET noseeone/footprint area was visible after the GOX vent hood was
retracted. A 2-inch long by 1-inch wide piece of topcoat along with superficial layer of CPR foam
was missing from an area 10 inches aft of the +Y louver and just aft of the XT-371 interface. The
topcoat adhered to the GOX vent seal during seal deflation/hood retraction.
After the 00:22:04 a.m. (local) launch on 3 February 1995, a debris walk down of Pad 39B was
performed. No flight hardware or TPS materials were found. There was no visual indication of a
stud hang-up on any of the south holddown posts. The HDP #2 shoe and EPON shim was
blackened more than usual as if some burning of grease or shim epoxy had been caused by the
SRB exhaust plume. All the T-0 umbilicals operated properly. Overall, damage to the launch pad
was minimal.
A total of 101 films and videos were analyzed as part of the post launch data review. No vehicle
damage or lost flight hardware was observed that would have affected the mission. One PR was
generated as a result of the film review. Film item E-33 showed approximately 16 inches of RSS
coax cable attached to the External Tank at the intertank umbilical carder assembly. The cable
should have remained with the GUCP during disconnect and retraction. A KSC lab report
attributed the cable failure to tensile overload. There was no evidence of a pre-existing condition,
such as cuts or excessive bending, that contributed to the failure. A suspect PR and TPS were
worked on ET-69 to verify proper configuration of the cable prior to STS-67 launch.
A white wispy streak of vapor streamed aft between Orbiter SSME #I and the vertical stabilizer
(right side) at T+43 seconds MET. The streak did not appear to be related to localized flow
condensation and was most likely water/steam "flashing" from the water spray boilers.
DTO-312 was not performed by the flight crew due to RCS propellant usage limitations. OV-104
was not equipped to carry umbilical cameras
The Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected at Hanger AF after retrieval. Both left and right Solid
Rocket Boosters sustained extensive structural damage from water impact loads due to high seas.
The LH Forward Assembly, LH nozzle, and one of the nozzle actuators were lost during towback
to the port. The RH frustum was missing no TPS but had 19 debonds over fasteners and 1 debond
over acreage. The LH frustum was missing no TPS but had 34 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners.
Orbiter performance as viewed on landing films and videos during final approach, touchdown, and
roUout was nominal. Drag chute operation was also normal.
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A post landing inspection of OV-103 Discovery was conducted on runway 15 at the Kennedy
Space Center. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 125 hits, of which 14 had a major dimension
of 1-inch or larger. Based on these numbers and comparison to statistics from prewous missions
of similar configuration, the total number of hits was average and the number of hits I-inch or
larger was less than average. The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 84 hits, of which 7 had
a major dimension of 1-inch or larger.
The largest tile damage site measured 5.5-inches by 1.5'inches by 0.75 inches deep and was
located on the lower surface outboard of the LI-I2 ET/ORB umbilical directly aft of the LH MLG.
The damage site was clean and did not exhibit the typical signs of re-entry heating. RTV was
missing from the main landing gear tire pressure transducer wiring harness. No RTV was found
on the runway, The RTV most likely came off during gear deployment and caused the damage
prior to touchdown. An EO will eliminate excessive RTV on the wiring harness.
Orbiter post landing mierochemical sample results revealed a variety of residuals in the Orbiter
window samples from the window protective covers, facility environment, SRB BSM exhaust,
Orbiter TPS, RCS thruster paper covers, and paints/primers from various sources. These residual
sampling data do not indicate a single source of damaging debris as all of these materials have
previously been documented in post-landing sample reports.
This set of post flight debris samples led to no new findings. However, a trend in lower surface
tile damage site residual material has been established. SRB Hypalon paint inclusions have been
detected in lower surface tile damage sites on STS-63, -66, -68, and -65. All of the samples show
the paint material had been exposed to heat effects. Hypalon paint does not adhere well to
Booster Trowelable Ablator ('BTA) closeouts during ascent aeroheating and reentry. Post-flight
assessment of the SRB's has revealed blistered/missing Hypalon paint from BTA on the frustums.
A total of seven Post Launch Anomalies, but no In-Hight Anomalies (IFA's), were observed
during the STS-63 mission assessment.
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2.0 PRE-LAUNCH BRIEFING
The Debris/Ice/TPS and Photographic Analysis Team briefing for launch activities was conducted
on 31 January 1995 at 1530 hours. The following personnel participated in various team activities,
assisted in the collection and evaluation of data, and contributed to reports contained in this
document.
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3.0 LAUNCH
STS-63 was launched at 95:034:05:22:03.994 GMT (00:22:04 a.m. local) on 3 February 1995.
3.1 PRE-LAUNCH SSV/PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
A pre-launch debris inspection of the launch pad and Shuttle vehicle was performed on
February 1, 1995, from 1630 to 1800 hours.The detailed walkdown of Pad 39B and MLP-2 also
included the primary flight elements OV-103 Discovery (20thTlight), ET-68 (LWT 61), and
BI-070 SRB's. Loose thermal curtain tape on the fight SRB was the only vehicle anomaly.
Five facility debris items were entered in Appendix K for resolution prior to ET cryoload: 1)
platforms and scaffolding not yet removed from the MLP zero level; 2) loose cotter pin tether and
grounding strap on east emergency egress crossover; 3) loose thermal tape on the RH SRB at_
skirt near I-IDP #2; 4) loose MLP zero level cover bolts; and 5) loose SRB hoist pedestal covers
and bolts.
The planned launch on 2 February 1995 was scrubbed for 24 hours due to the failure of an Orbiter
Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU). The problem was detected prior to cryogenic loading.
3.2 FINAL INSPECTION
The Final Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was performed on 2 February 1995 from 1800 to
1945 hours during the two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There were no
Launch Commit Criteria (LCC), OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria violations. No IPR's were
taken. Due to the ambient weather conditions at this time of year, the potential existed for acreage
icing. There were no protuberance icing conditions outside of the established data base.
Ambient weather conditions at the time of the inspection were:
T-3 Hours T-0 Launch
Wind Speed (knots):
Wind Direction (degrees):
Relative Humidity (percent):
Temperature (degrees F):
Dew Point (degrees F):
O9 10
259 233
66 84
61 55
50 50
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning radiometer was utilized to obtain
vehicle surface temperature measurements for an overall thermal assessment of the vehicle, as
shown in Figures 1 and 2.
3.3 ORBITER
No Orbiter tile or RCC panel anomalies were observed. All RCS thruster paper covers were intact
and dry with the exception of L4D. This cover was damp. Typical ice/frost accumulations were
present at the SSME #1 and #2 heat shield-to-nozzle interfaces. An infrared scan revealed no
unusual temperature gradients on the base heat shield or engine mounted heat shields.
3.4 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
SRB case temperatures measured by the fixed STI radiometers ranged from 57-61 degrees F. In
comparison, temperatures measured by the SRB Ground Environment Instrumentation (GEI)
ranged from 59-67 degrees F. All measured temperatures were above the 34 degrees F minimum
requirement. The predicted Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature (PMBT) supplied by MTI was 59
degrees F, which was within the required range of 44-86 degrees F.
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Figure 1 : Vehicle Surface Temperature STI Measurements
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Figure 2 : Vehicle Surface Temperature STI Measurements
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3.5 EXTERNAL TANK
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run from 2045 to 0530 hours GMT
and the results tabulated in Figure 3. The program predicted condensate with no ice/frost
accumulation on the TPS acreage surfaces for most areas of the ET with the exception of the LH2
tank barrel section (XT-1120 through XT-1380) during cryoload. The program predicted the
surface temperature in this area would fall below 32 degrees Fahrenheit starting at 0045 GMT.
The Final Inspection Team observed very light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulations, on
the LO2 tank. The portable STI measured surface temperatures that averaged 49 degrees on the
ogive and 44 degrees F on the barrel section. SURFICE predicted temperatures of 48 degrees F
on the ogive and 43 degrees F on the barrel section. There were no TPS anomalies.
The intertank acreage exhibited no TPS anomalies. Typical ice/frost accumulation, but no unusual
vapor, was present on the ET umbilical carrier plate. The portable STI measured an average
surface temperature of 60 degrees F on the intertank.
There were no LH2 tank TPS acreage anomalies. Very light condensate, but no ice or frost
accumulations, were present on the acreage. The portable STI measured surface temperatures that
averaged 48 degrees on the upper LH2 tank. The lower LH2 tank was generally 48 degrees F
with the exception of the frost-covered +Y+Z and +Y-Z quadrants, which measured 32 degrees
F. SURFICE predicted temperatures of 39 degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 45 degrees F on
the barrel section. Frost had also formed along the PAL, pressurization line, and cable tray ramp-
to-acreage interfaces.
There were no anomalies on the bipod jack pad closeouts. A crack, 8 inches long by 1/2-inch
wide, was present in the -Y ET/SRB cable tray forward surface TPS. The crack extended
approximately 10 inches aft on the inboard side of the vertical strut. The presence of the crack
was acceptable for flight per the NSTS-08303 criteria. Small ice/frost spots had formed on the +Y
vertical strut drain hole and strut aft surface-to-acreage interface.
Typical amounts of ice/frost had accumulated in the LO2 feedline bellows and support brackets.
There were no TPS anomalies on the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical. Acreage ice/frost was more
widespread than usual but still acceptable for flight. Some ice and frost had formed on the ai_ side
of the umbilical. Ice/frost fingers on the separation bolt pyrotechnic canister purge vents were
typical.
Ice and frost in the LI-I2 recirculation line bellows and on both burst disks was typical. The LH2
feedline bellows were covered by some ice/frost and condensate,
Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge
barrier top and outboard sides. Typical ice/frost fingers were present on the pyro canister and
plate gap purge vents. There was no ice/frost on the 17-inch flapper valve actuator access port
foam plug. Ice/frost had formed on the aft pyro canister closeout bondline. No unusual vapors or
cryogenic drips had appeared during tanking, stable replenish, and launch.
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Figure 3 : SURFICE Computer Predictions
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The summaryof Ice/FrostTeamobservations/anomalies,whichwereall acceptablefor launchper
theNSTS-08303criteria,consistedof five OTV recordeditems:
Anomaly 001 documented an 8-inch by 1/2-inch crack in the forward surface TPS of the -Y
vertical strut/ET-SRB cable tray. The crack extended approximately 10 inches aft on the inboard
side of the vertical strut.
Anomaly 002 documented two 1-inch diameter ice/frost spots on the +Y vertical strut aft side: at
the drain hole and at the strut-to-aft dome interface.
Anomaly 003 documented ice/frost formations in the LO2 feedline support brackets and bellows.
Anomaly 004 documented ice/frost formations on the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical purge vents and the
LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge vents, recirculation line bellows, and purge barrier.
Anomaly 005 documented a 2-inch long by 1-inch wide piece of topcoat along with superficial
layer of CPR foam missing from an area 10 inches aft of the +Y louver and just aft of the XT-371
interface. The topcoat adhered to the GOX vent seal during seal deflation/hood retraction. An
effort is in work to establish the need for topcoat/foam peel-off/adhesion acceptance criteria
during seal retraction.
. ÷
t,_ .t
3.6 FACILITY
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and properly configured for launch (LCC
requirement).
No leaks were observed on either the LO2 or LH2 Orbiter T-0 umbilicals, the GH2 vent line, or
the Ground Umbilical Carrier Plate (GUCP).
Minor damage to the ET nosecone/footprint area was visible after the GOX vent hood was
retracted. A 2-inch long by 1-inch wide piece of topcoat along with superficial layer of CPR foam
was missing from an area 10 inches aft of the +Y louver and just aft of the XT-371 interface. The
topcoat adhered to the GOX vent seal during seal deflation/hood retraction.
10
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Photo 2 : Overall View of LH2 Tank
Light frost, but no dctcctablc icc, formcd on thc LH2 tank +Y sidc
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Photo 3 : ET LO2 Feedline
Typical ice/frost had formed in the LO2 feedline bellows and support brackets
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JPhoto 4 : -Y ET/SRB Vertical Strut
A crack, 8 inches long by I/2-inch wide, was present in the -Y ETISRB cable tray forward
surface TPS. The presence of the crack was acceptable for flight per thc NSTS-08303 Criteria.
13
ORIGINAL PAGE
COLOR PHOTOGRAPH
V
2Z z !
Photo 5 : -Y ET/SRB Vertical Strut
The crack extended approximately 10 inches aft on the inboard side of the vertical strut.
The presence of the crack was acceptable for flight per the NSTS-08303 criteria.
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Photo 6 : LO2 ET/ORB Umbilical
Ice/frost formations on the umbilical and purge vents were acceptable for flight
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Photo 7 : LH2 ET/ORB Umbilical
Typical ice/frost formations on the umbilical were acceptable for flight
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4.0 POST LAUNCH PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
The post launch inspection of the MLP, FSS and RSS was conducted on 3 February 1995 from
Launch + 2 to 4 hours.
No flight hardware or TPS materials were found. A facility bolt, one inch in length, was recovered
on the west side of the MLP deck.
South SRB HDP erosion was typical. All south HDP shoe EPON shim material was intact. There
was no visual indication of a stud hang-up on any of the south holddown posts. The HDP #2 shoe
and EPON shim was blackened more than usual as if some burning of grease or shim epoxw, had
been caused by the SRB exhaust plume. All of the north HDP doghouse blast covers were m the
closed position. Erosion of the blast covers was also typical. Minor damage to the SRB aft skirt
purge lines and T-0 umbilicals was similar to previous launches.
The Tail Service Masts (TSM) and Orbiter Access Arm (OAA) appeared undamaged. Minor
damage to the GOX vent hood included a 4-inch by 4-inch piece of instafoam missing from a vent
duet and a loose bracket shim on the south tip purge line.
The GH2 vent line was latched on the 8th tooth of the latching mechanism, had no loose cables
(static retract lanyard), and appeared to have latched properly with no rebound.
Recent construction of Substation 1032 at the base of the northeast pad slope included an
aluminum rain gutter with two downspouts. The Debris Team and Pad Managers expressed
concern about the effects of the SRB plume/shock wave on the lightweight aluminum pieces.
Thicker aluminum angle stock was bolted to the wall and to the underside of the gutter in an
attempt to strengthen the structure. However, post launch inspection of the pad revealed
substantial damage to the gutter. One 8 foot section lay in the pad acreage near camera site #2.
The rest of the gutter was deformed and bent upward.
Minor, but typical, pad damage included:
Broken stadium lights on the east and northwest sides of the pad surface
Bent access platform grating on the MLP zero level east side
Missing cable tray cover on the FSS 235 foot level
Debris inspections of the pad acreage and flame trench were completed on 6 February 1995. No
flight hardware or TPS material was found with the exception of SRB throat plug material
scattered across the pad acreage southeast of the MLP. The presence of this material confirmed
the identity of the objects falling out of the SSME exhaust plume in film item E-62.
Post launch pad inspection anomalies are listed in Section 10.
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Photo 8 : Blackened HDP #2 Shoe/EPON Shim
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5.0 FILM REVIEW
Anomalies observed in the Film Review were presented to the Mission Management Team,
Shuttle managers, and vehicle systems engineers. One PR was generated as a result of the film
review.
OTV 160 and OTV 162 showed a 2-inch long by 1-inch wide piece of topcoat along with
superficial layer of CPR foam was missing from an area 10 inches aft of the +Y louver and just aft
of the XT-371 interface in the GOX seal footprint. The topcoat adhered to the GOX vent seal
during seal deflation/hood retraction. An effort is in work to establish the need for topcoat/foam
peel-off/adhesion acceptance criteria during seal retraction.
Film item E-33 showed approximately 16 inches of RSS coax cable attached to the External Tank
at the intertank umbilical carrier assembly. The cable should have remained with the GUCP during
disconnect and retraction. A KSC Material Science Laboratory report (95-1M0019) attributed the
cable failure to tensile overload. There was no evidence of a pre-existing condition, such as cuts
or excessive bending, that contributed to the failure. Suspect PR ET-69-EL-0002 and TPS $70-
1261-00-001-012 were taken to verify proper configuration of the cable on ET-69 (STS-67).
Post flight anomalies are listed in Section 10.
5.1 LAUNCH FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
A total of 101 films and videos, which included thirty-eight 16mm films, twenty 35mm films, four
70ram films, and thirty-nine videos, were reviewed starting on launch day.
No vehicle damage or lost flight hardware Was observed that would have affected the mission.
Dark carbon-type residue from the GOX seals, which had appeared on the STS-64 and STS-68
ET noseeones, was not present on the STS-63 ET-68 noseeone after the GOX vent hood was
retracted (OTV 113, 160, 162). However, frost had formed on the southwest louver bolt heads.
The presence of frost was not a constraint to launch (OTV 162).
Fore-and-aft movement of the Orbiter base heat shield in the centerline area between the SSME
cluster occurred during engine start-up. The motion was similar to that observed on previous
launches (E-76,-77).
SSME ignition, Math diamond formation, and gimbal profile appeared normal (OTV 151, 170,
171). Ice/frost accumulations on the SSME #2 nozzle-to-heat shield interface were typical (OTV
150). Free burning hydrogen had drifted under the body flap and upward to the base heat shield/
RH OMS pod during ignition (OTV 163, I70, 171). Streaks occurred in the SSME #1 and #2
plumes during startup (E-2, -3, -6).
A small, dark piece of debris, origin unknown, first appeared near the OMS pod and moved to the
right field of view at high speed. No vehicle contact was observed (E-3).
A 2-inch by 1-inch piece of tile surface coating material was lost from the base heat shield
outboard of SSME #3 (E-17, OTV 149) during SSME ignition. Small pieces of tile surface
coating material were lost from seven places on the base heat shield outboard of SSME #2 (E-18,
OTV 150) and from one place on the aft surface of the left RCS stinger (E-19). Three light spots
on base heat shield tiles between SSME #2/#3 and the body flap were also identified as areas of
missing tile surface coating material (E-6).
19
SSMEignition caused numerous pieces of ice to fall from the ET/Orbiter umbilicals. Some pieces
of ice contacted the umbilical cavity sill and were deflected outward, but no tile damage was
visible (OTV 109, 163, 164). Falling pieces of ice from the LH2 feedline bellows contacted the
LH2 recirculation line, but no TPS damage was apparent (OTV 109, 164).
The External Tank "twanged" approximately 32 inches during SSME ignition (E-79).
The holddown post films revealed no stud hang-ups. NO ordnance fragments or frangible nut
pieces fell from any of the DCS/stud holes. North holddown post doghouse blast covers closed
normally. A piece of thermal curtain tape was loose on the RI-I booster (E-9, -25, -77). Two small
pieces of instafoam from the LH aft skirt aft ring area near HDP #8 broke off and fell into the
SRB exhaust hole (E-14). At least eight flat, dark objects, which may have been sound
suppression cloth parts tags, were ejected out of the RH SRB exhaust hole near HDP #4 (E-7).
Grease or EPON shim epoxy was visible burning on the HDP #2 shoe at T+8 seconds MET 0_-8)
The Orbiter LH2 and LO2 T-0 umbilicals disconnected and retracted properly rE-17, -18; OTV
149, 150). After the GUCP disconnected from the External Tank, approximately 16 inches of
RSS coax cable was visible still attached to the intertank umbilical carrier assembly (E-33; OTV
104, 167). The cable should have remained with the GUCP. GH2 vent line capture and latch was
nominal, though some slack in the static retract lanyard caused slight contact with the GUCP
legs/crossbeam 03-42; OTV 160, 167).
Numerous objects, both light and dark in color, dropped out of the SSME exhaust plume over the
southeast part of the pad after the vehicle cleared the tower (E-62). The objects were thought to
be pieces of SRB throat plug material and sound suppression water trough material, a finding later
confirmed by the Post Launch Pad Acreage Inspection.
As many as 10 pieces of ice from the LO2 feedline upper bellows fell aft during liftoff and tower
clear. Some of these pieces contacted the Orbiter, but no damage was apparent (E-40, -54).
Pieces of ET/ORB umbilical purge barrier material and RCS thruster paper covers fell aft during
ascent (E-213, -220, -224).
A white wispy streak of vapor streamed aft between Orbiter SSME # 1 and the vertical stabilizer
(right side) at T+43 seconds MET. The streak did not appear to be related to localized flow
condensation and was most likely water/steam "flashing" from the water spray boilers (E-205,
-207, -220, -222, -223).
Body flap movement (amplitude and frequency) was similar to previous flights (E-207, -212,
-213).
Numerous small pieces of SRB propellant or aft skirt instafoam dropped out of the SRB exhaust
plume from T+59 through T+75 seconds MET (TV-4B; E-218).
Programmed movement of the elevons for load relief during ascent was visible 03-207, -212).
A white object moved vertically in the left FOV of TV-5 after SRB separation. The object was
not near the vehicle and may have been a star imaged by the moving tracker.
ET aft dome charring and exhaust plume recirculation was typical. SRB plume tailoff and
separation appeared normal. Numerous pieces of slag dropped out of the exhaust plume before,
during, and after SRB separation - a common event (TV-13; E-207, -212, -220, -224).
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Photo 9 : Missing Topcoat from ET Nose Cone
A small piece of topcoat along with superficial layer of CPR foam adhered to the
GOX vent seal during seal deflation/hood retraction.
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%Photo 10 : Missing Topcoat from ET Nose Cone
A 2-inch long by 1-inch wide piece of topcoat along with superficial layer of CPR foam was
missing from an area 10 inches aft of the +Y louver and just aft of the XT-371 interface as a result
of GOX vent seal deflation/hood retraction.
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vPhoto 11 : ET RSS Coax Cable
Approximately 16 inches of RSS coax cable attached to the External Tank at the intertank
umbilical cartier assembly should have remained with the GUCP during disconnect and retraction
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Photo 12 : HDP #2 EPON Shim Burning
Grease or EPON shim epoxy was visiblc burning on the HDP #2 shoc at T+8 seconds MET
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LPhoto 13 : Vapor Streak at T+43 Seconds MET
A white wispy streak of vapor streamed aft between Orbiter SSME #I and the vertical stabilizer
(right side) at T+43 seconds MET. The streak did not appear to be related to localized flow
condensation and was most likely water/steam "flashing" from the water spray boilers,
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5.2 ON-ORBIT FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
DTO-312 was not performed by the flight crew due to RCS propellant usage limitations. OV-104
was not equipped to carry umbilical cameras
5.3 LANDING FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
Ten 35ram large format films and nine videos of landing were reviewed.
Orbiter performance on final approach appeared normal. Some "slipping and crabbing" was visible
on final approach. There were no anomalies when the landing gear was extended. Touchdown of
the left and right main gear was nominal and virtually simultaneous. The LH MLG tire touched
down on the runway centerline. The Orbiter drifted a little further west before correction back to
eenterline. Contrails on the wing tips were typical.
The drag chute was deployed atter breakover, but before the nose gear contacted the nmway.
Drag chute deployment appeared nominal. Two pieces of black material, which are made of
Teflon cloth and used in packing of the chute to prevent abrasion, were visa'ble falling to the
runway during chute deployment.
Touchdown of the nose landing gear was smooth.
Rollout and wheel stop were uneventful. No large tile damage sites were visible on the Orbiter
lower surface.
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6.0 SRB POST FLIGHT/RE_VAL DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
The Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected for debris damage and debris sources at CCAFS
Hangar AF on 7 February 1995. Both left and right Solid Rocket Boosters sustained extensive
structural damage from water impact loads due to high seas. The LH Forward Assembly, LH
nozzle, and one of the nozzle actuators were lost during towback to the port.
V
6.1 RH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION
The RB frustum was missing no TPS but had 19 debonds over fasteners and 1 debond over
acreage (Figure 4). Hypalon paint was blistered/missing where BTA ctoseouts had been applied
along the 395 ring frame and around the BSM's. Some of the underlying BTA was sooted. The
BSM aero heat shield covers had locked in the fully opened position though all four cover attach
rings had been deformed by parachute riser entanglement.
The R.H forward assembly had no debonds or missing TPS. Hypalon paint was blisteredtmissing
over the areas where BTA had been applied. Structurally, the forward assembly was buckled in an
area near the flight door. Cork closeout and 4 pins were missing from the forward assembly-to-
forward se.gment joint at the 240 degree location. Twelve pins were missing from the frustum
severance ring.
Three of the SRM segment cases exhibited buckling-type indentations caused by water impact
loads. The systems tunnel cable tray and covers were also damaged. The Field Joint Protection
System (FJPS) closeouts were generally in good condition. Trailing edge damage to the FJPS and
the GEl cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from severance of the nozzle extension.
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB struts appeared to be
undamaged. Damage to the ETA ring, IEA, and IEA covers was caused by water impact loads.
The aft booster stiffener ring splice plate closeouts were intact and no K5NA material was
missing.
The phenolic material on the kick ring exhibited minor delamination. Ait skirt acreage MSA-2
appeared to have been intact for the ascent phase of flight. Hypalon paint was blistered/missing
over the areas where BTA had been applied. The HDP Debris Containment System (DCS)
plungers were seated and appeared to have functioned properly.
V_
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Figure 4 : RH SRB Frustum
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Photo 14 : RH Frustum
The RH frustum was missing no TPS but had 19 debond_s over fasteners and 1 debond over
acreage. Hypalon paint was blistered/missing where BTA closeouts had been applied along the
395 ring frame and around the BSM's. '
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Photo 15 : BSM Aero Heat Shield Covers
The BSM aero heat shield covers had locked in the fully opened position though
all four cover attach rings had been deformed by parachute riser entanglement.
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/Photo 16 : RH Forward Assembly
The RH forward assembly had no debonds or missing TPS as a result of flight conditions.
Hypalon paint was blistered/missing over the areas where BTA had been applied. Structurally, the
forward assembly was buckled in an area near the flight door due to water slapdown loads. The
systems tunnel was also damaged.
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Photo 17 : RH Aft Booster/Aft Skirt
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Photo 18 : Condition of Aft Skirt Acreage TPS
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6.2 LH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION
The LH frustum was missing no TPS but had 34 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners (Figure 5).
Hypalon paint was blistered/missing where BTA had been applied along the 395 ring frame and
around the BSM's. Some of the underlying BTA was sooted. The BSM aero heat shield covers
had locked in the fully opened position though two of the cover attach rings had been deformed
by parachute riser entanglement.
The LH forward assembly was lost during towback.
Three of the SRM segment cases exhibited buckling-type indentations caused by water impact
loads. The systems tunnel cable tray and covers were also damaged. The Field Joint Protection
System (FJPS) closeouts were in good condition. In general, minor trailing edge damage to the
FJPS and the GEI cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from severance of the nozzle
extension.
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB aft struts, ETA ring, IEA, and
IEA covers appeared undamaged. The stiffener ring splice plate closeouts were intact and no
KSNA material was missing.
Three layers of phenolic material had delaminated on the kick ring - a typical occurrence. Aft skirt
acreage TPS was generally in good condition. Hypalon paint was blistered over areas where BTA
had been applied. The HDP Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were not examined
because GSE to secure the nozzle plug had been placed in the stud holes.
SRB Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section 10.
34
III
Z
0
Z
V
Figure 5 : LH SRB Frustum
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Photo 19 : LH Frustum
The LH frustum was missing no TPS but had 34 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners. Hypalon paint
was blistered/trUssing where BTA had been applied along the 395 ring flame. Some of the
underlying BTA was sooted.
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Photo 20 : BSM Aero Heat Shield Covers
The BSM aero heat shield covers had locked in the fully opened position though
two of the cover attach rings had been deformed by parachute riser entanglement
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2Photo 21 : LH Forward Assembly Lost During Towback
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Photo 22 : LH Aft Booster/Aft Skirt
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Photo 23 : Condition of Aft Skirt Acreage TPS
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7.0 ORBITER POST LANDING DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
A post landing debris inspection of OV-103 (Discovery) was conducted 11-12 February 1995 at
the Kennedy Space Center on Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) runway 15 and in the Orbiter
Processing Facility bay #2. This inspection was performed to identify debris impact damage and, if
possible, debris sources. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 125 hits, of which 14 had a major
dimension of 1-inch or larger. This total does not include the numerous hits on the base heat
shield attributed to SSME vibration/acoustics and exhaust plume recirculation. A comparison of
these numbers to statistics from 51 previous missions of similar configuration (excluding missions
STS-23, 25, 26, 26R, 27R, 30R, and 42, which had damage from known debris sources),
indicates the total number of hits was average while the number of hits 1-inch or larger was less
than average (Figures 6-9).
The following table breaks down the STS-63 Orbiter debris damage by area:
HITS > 1" TOTAL HITS
Lower surface 7 84
Upper surface 4 22
Right side 0 3
Left side 0 3
Right OMS Pod 0 3
Left OMS Pod 3 10
TOTALS 14 125
The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 84 hits, of which 7 had a major dimension of 1-inch
or larger.
The largest tile damage site measured 5.5-inches by 1.5-inches by 0.75 inches deep and was
located on the lower surface outboard of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical directly aft of the LH MLG.
The damage site was clean and did not exhibit the typical signs of re-entry heating. RTV was
missing from the main landing gear tire pressure transducer wiring harness. No RTV was found
on the runway. The RTV most likely came off during gear deployment and caused the damage
prior to touchdown. An EO will eliminate excessive RTV on the wiring harness. No other TPS
damage was attributed to material from the wheels, tires, or brakes. The tires were in good
condition after a landing on the KSC runway.
No ice adhered to the payload bay door and the waste water dump nozzles appeared normal. No
unusual tile damage was visible on the leading edges of the OMS pods and vertical stabilizer.
The number of hits aft of the LH2 and LO2 ET/ORB umbilicals, which are believed to be impacts
from umbilical ice, were less than usual.
No tile damage from micrometeorites or on-orbit debris have been identified to date.
An 8-inch dark streak was visible on the left wing RCC panel #6. A 10-inch white streak appeared
on the fight wing RCC panel #5.
ET/Orbiter separation devices EO-1, EO-2, and EO-3 functioned properly and the debris plungers
were seated. All ET/Orbiter umbilical separation ordnance retention shutters were closed. No
significant amounts of foam or red purge seal adhered to the LI-I2 ET/ORB umbilical near the
4-inch flapper valve. No debris was found on the runway beneath the ET/ORB umbilical cavities.
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Orbiter window #4 exhibited moderate-to-heavy hazing. Windows #3 and #5 exhibited light-to-
moderate hazing. Only a very light haze was present on the other windows. Surface wipes will be
taken from all windows for laboratory analysis. Tile damage on the window perimeter tiles was
typical. A tile damage site, 5 inches long by 0.4 inches wide, was located in the area between
windows #4/5 and #7/8. Although the tile material appeared to have been depressed to a depth of
approximately 0.1 inch, none of the tile surface coating material was missing.
Tile damage on the base heat shield was typical with the exception of a damage site that involved
three tiles between SSME #2/3 and the body flap hinge. This tile damage site, which measured
approximately 10 inches long by 1 inch wide by 0.25 inch deep, had been observed in the launch
film review (film item E-6) prior to T-0. The damage occurred sometime during SSME start-up.
Tiles on the vertical stabilizer "stinger" and around the drag chute door were intact and
undamaged. The Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) closeout blankets were frayed/tipped on
SSME #1 at the 6 o'clock position and tom on SSME #2 at the 3 o'clock position.
There were no unusual surface cracks on vertical stabilizer tiles.
Runway 15 had been swept/inspected by SLF operations personnel prior to landing and all
potentially damaging debris was removed.
The post landing walkdown of Runway 15 was performed immediately after landing. No flight
hardware was found on the runway. All Orbiter drag chute hardware, including two dark pieces of
packing cloth to prevent chute abrasion, was recovered. No organic (bird) debris was found on
the runway.
In summary, the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits was avera.ge while the number of hits
1-inch or larger was less than average when compared to previous nussions (Figures 10-11). The
type of TPS damage was typical and not attributable to any single debris source.
Orbiter Post Launch Debris Anomalies are listed in Section 10.
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Figure 6 : Orbiter Lower Surface Debris Map
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VFigure 7 : Orbiter Right Side Debris Map
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Figure 9 : Orbiter Upper Surface Debris Map
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LOWER SURFACE ENTIRE VEHICLE
HITS > 1 INCH TOTAL HITS HITS > 1 INCH TOTAL HITS
STS-6 15 80 36 120
S TS-8 3 29 7 56
STS-9 (41-A) 9 49 14 58
S-IS- 11 (4 l-B) 11 19 34 63
STS-13 (41-C) 5 27 8 36
STS-14 (41-13) 10 44 30 111
STS-17 (41-G) 25 69 36 154
STS-19 (51-A) 14 66 20 87
STS-20 (51-C) 24 67 28 81
STS-27 (51-1) 21 96 33 141
STS-28 (51-J) 7 66 17 111
S TS-30 (6I-A) 24 129 34 183
STS-31 (61-B) 37 177 55 257
STS-32 (61-C) 20 134 39 193
STS-2g 18 100 23 132
S TS-28R 13 60 20 76
STS-34 17 51 18 53
STS-33R 21 107 21 118
STS-32R 13 111 15 120
STS-36 17 61 19 81
STS-31R 13 47 14 63
STS-41 13 64 16 76
S TS-38 7 70 8 81
STS-35 15 132 I7 147
STS-37 7 91 10 113
STS-39 14 217 16 238
S TS-40 23 153 25 197
STS-43 24 122 25 131
STS-48 14 100 25 182
STS-44 6 74 9 101
STS-45 18 122 22 172
STS-49 6 55 11 114
S TS-50 28 141 45 184
S TS-46 11 186 22 236
STS-47 3 48 11 108
S TS-52 6 152 16 290
STS-53 11 145 23 240
STS-54 14 80 14 131
STS-56 18 94 36 156
STS-55 10 128 13 143
STS-57 10 75 I2 106
STS-51 8 100 18 154
STS-58 23 78 26 155
STS-61 7 59 13 120
STS-60 4 48 15 106
STS-62 7 36 16 97
S TS-5 g 10 47 19 77
STS-65 17 123 21 151
STS-64 18 116 19 150
ST8-68 9 59 15 110
S TS-66 22 111 28 148
AVERAGE 14.1 90.5 21.3 131.5
SIGMA 7.2 43.3 "_0.0 55.5
MISSIONS STS-23, 24, 25, 26, 26R, 27R, 3OR, AND 42 ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THIS ANAL YSI.
SINCE THESE MISSIONS HAD SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE CAUSED BY KNOWN DEBRIS SOUR£
Figure 10 : Orbiter Post Flight Debris Damage Summary
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Figure 11 : Orbiter Debris Damage Comparison Chart
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Photo 24 : OV-103 Landing on KSC Runway 15
Centerline camera shows wings-level touchdown just west of runway centerline
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\Photo 25 : Overall View of Orbiter Right Side
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Photo 26 : Overall View of Orbiter Left Side
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Photo 27 : Lower Surface Tile Damage
The largest tile damage site measured 5.5-inches by 1.5-inches by 0.75 inches deep and was
located on the lower surface outboard of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical directly aft of the LH MLG.
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Photo 28 : LO2 ET/ORB Umbilical
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iPhoto 29 : LH2 ET/ORB Umbilical
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Photo 30 : Orbiter Windows
Orbiter window #4 exhibited moderate-to-heavy hazing,
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Photo 31 : Overall View of Base Heat Shield
Tile damage on the base heat shield was typical with the exception of a damage site that involved
three tiles between SSME #2/3 and the body flap hinge. Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS)
closeout blankets were frayed/ripped on SSME #1 at the 6 o'clock position and tom on SSME #2
at the 3 o'clock position.
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Photo 32 : Base Heat Shield Tile Damage
This tile damage site, which measured approximately 10 inches long by 1 inch wide by 0.25 inch
deep, had been observed in the launch film review prior to T-0. The damage occurred sometime
during SSME start-up.
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9.0 DEBRIS SAMPLE LAB REPORTS
A total of nine samples were obtained from OV-103 Discovery during the STS-63 post landing
debris assessment at Kennedy Space Center, Florida. The submitted samples consisted of 8 wipes
from Orbiter windows #1-8 and 1 lower surface tile damage site sample from the RH wing. The
samples were analyzed by the NASA KSC Microchemical Analysis Branch (MAB) for material
composition and comparison to known STS materials. Debris analysis involves both the placing
and the correlating of particles and residues with respect to composition, thermal (mission)
effects, and availability. Debris sample results/analyses are listed by Orbiter location in the
following summaries. Also included in this report are results from a RH wing lower surface tile
damage site sample from the STS-66 mission. The sample had not been taken until after the fen'y
flight to KSC.
9.1 ORBITER WINDOWS
Samples from the Orbiter windows indicated exposure to facility environment, SRB BSM exhaust
(facility insulation, metallic particulate), landing site materials (earth minerals), Orbiter Thermal
Protection System (tile, tile repair, RTV and high temperature insulation), paints and primer from
various sources. Paint particulate continues to be present in a variety of colors: black, white, red,
and yellow. The yellow paint particulate contained lead, which is typically found in facility/GSE
paint. There was no apparent vehicle damage related to these residuals.
9.2 RH WING LOWER SURFACE TILE
The sample from the RH lower surface tile damage site revealed tile particles and Hypalon (SRB)
paint. This finding, previously observed on STS-68 and STS-65, is discussed under new findings.
9.3 ORGANIC ANALYSIS
The results of the STS-63 organic analysis are shown in Figure 12. Identified materials include
those associated with window covers (plastic polymers), RTV from RCS thruster nozzle cover
adhesive and from Orbiter Thermal Protection System, and paint from various sources. There was
no apparent vehicle damage related to these residuals.
9.4 STS-66 RH WING LOWER SURFACE TILE
After Orbiter OV-104 Atlantis ferry flight to KSC and mission STS-66 post flight processing,
debris material was found in a R/-I wing lower surface tile damage site. The recovered material
sample was identified by laboratory analysis to contain tile particles and Hypalon (SRB) paint.
This sampling result is consistent with that of STS-63, STS-68, and STS-65.
9.5 NEW FINDINGS
This set of post flight debris samples led to no new findings. However, a trend in lower surface
tile damage site residual material has been established. SRB Hypalon paint inclusions have been
detected in lower surface tile damage sites on STS-63, -66, -68, and -65. All of the samples show
the paint material had been exposed to heat effects. Hypalon paint does not adhere well to
Booster Trowelable Ablator (BTA) closeouts during ascent aeroheating and reentry. Post-flight
assessment of the SRB's revealed blistered/missing Hypalon paint from BTA closeouts on the
frustums and forward assemblies. Program management decided to assign no IFA, but
surveillance of the trend will continue.
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Figure 12 : Orbiter Post Landing Microchemical Sample Results
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10.0 POST LAUNCH ANOMALIES
Based on the debris walkdowns and film/video review, 7 post launch anomalies, but no In-Hight
Anomalies (IFA's), were observed on the STS-63 mission.
10.1 LAUNCH PAD/SHUTTLE LANDING FACILITY
1. The gutter on the newly constructed building for Substation 1032 sustained substantial damage
from the SRB plume/shock wave. One 8 foot section of gutter lay in the pad acreage near camera
site #2. An attempt to strengthen the gutter prior to launch was unsuccessful.
2. Post launch film review showed approximately 16 inches of RSS coax cable attached to the
External Tank at the intertank umbilical carrier assembly. The cable should have remained with
the GUCP during disconnect and retraction of the GH2 vent line. A KSC lab report attributed the
cable failure to tensile overload. There was no evidence of a pre-existing condition, such as cuts
or excessive bending, that contributed to the failure. Suspect PR ET-69-EL-0002 and TPS $70-
1261-00-001-012 were taken to verify proper configuration of the cable on ET-69 (STS-67).
10.2 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
1. Both right and left frustums had a total of 54 MSA-2 debonds.
2. A trend in Orbiter lower surface tile damage site residual material has been established. SRB
Hypalon paint inclusions have been detected in lower surface tile damage sites on STS-63, -66,
-68, and -65. All of the samples show the paint material had been exposed to heat effects.
Hypalon paint does not adhere well to Booster Trowelable Ablator (BTA) closeouts during
ascent aeroheating and reentry. Post-flight assessment of the SRB's revealed blistered/missing
Hypalon paint from BTA closeouts on the frustums and forward assemblies. Program
management decided to assign no IFA, but surveillance of the trend will continue.
10.3 EXTERNAL TANK
1. A 2-inch long by 1-inch wide piece of topcoat along with superficial layer of CPR foam was
missing from an area 10 inches aft of the +Y louver and just aft of the XT-371 interface. The
topcoat adhered to the GOX vent seal during seal deflation/hood retraction. An effort is in work
to establish the need for topcoat/foam peel-off/adhesion acceptance criteria during seal retraction.
10.4 ORBITER
1. The largest tile damage site measured 5.5-inches by 1.5-inches by 0.75 inches deep and was
located on the lower surface outboard of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical directly aft of the LH MLG.
The damage site was clean and did not exhibit the typical signs of re-entry heating. RTV was
missing from the main landing gear tire pressure transducer wiring harness. No RTV was found
on the runway. The RTV most likely came off during gear deployment and caused the damage
prior to touchdown. An EO will eliminate excessive RTV on the wiring harness.
2. Tile damage on the base heat shield was typical with the exception of a damage site that
involved three tiles between SSME #2/3 and the body flap hinge. This tile damage site, which
measured approximately 10 inches long by 1 inch wide by 0.25 inch deep, had been observed in
the launch film review (film item E-6) prior to T-0. The damage occurred somelSme during SSME
start-up.
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1. OV-103 STS-63 FILM/VIDEO SCREENING AND TIMING
. OV-103 STS-63 FILM/VIDEO SCREENING AND TIMING
SUMMARY
1.1 SCREENING ACTIVITIES
1.1.1 Launch
Discovery (OV-103) launched on mission STS-63 from Pad B at 05:22:04.005
Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) on February 3, 1995 (day 34) as seen on camera E8.
Solid rocket booster (SRB) separation occurred at 034:05:24:09.021 UTC as seen on
camera E207.
On launch day, 24 videos were screened. Following launch day, 52 films were reviewed.
No anomalies were observed during launch.
DTO-312 photography of the STS-63 external tank was not acquired due to darkness.
1.1.2 On-Orbit
At the request of the MER Manager, the IS&AG conducted an analysis of Shuttle
downlink video to estimate the size and velocity of nitrogen tetroxide particles
("snowballs") leaking from the RIU RCS thruster (a similar analysis was conducted on
the R4U leak on STS-42). This information was provided to the MER manager in
support of the decision on the rendezvous approach distance to the Mir.
In addition, the Image Science and Analysis Group (IS&AG) provided image analysis
support to the Orbital DEbris RAdar Calibration Spheres (ODERACS) experiment. The
velocities of dipoles and spheres ejected from a Get-Away-Special can located in the
Shuttle cargo bay were calculated from video data. This analysis data was provided to
the ODERACS principal investigators within thirty minutes of deployment.
The IS&AG also provided suggestions of viewing angle and lighting conditions to the
Life Support Systems Branch for the investigation of the waste water purge process. This
investigation attempted to replicate ice buildup conditions noted on the previous mission
(STS-66). The IS&AG inputs were requested to optimize the quality of the acquired
video data of the waste water purge process. IS&AG personnel recommended lighting,
camera, and view angle parameters to provide the best data.
Finally, Detailed Test Objective 1118 (MIR Micrometeoroid & Debris Impact Photo
Survey) was successfully conducted on STS-63 during the MIR space station rendezvous
on February 6, 1995. Approximately one thousand still photographs and ten hours of
video of the MIR Space Station were acquired. Preliminary screening of the data has
been completed, and an overall assessment of the data has been prepared. Analysis of the
MIR survey imagery data is in progress. This assessment is being factored into the MIR
imagery survey planning for STS-71. A final report documenting the analysis and results
from this DTO will be generated and distributed by the end of April 1995.
1.1.3 Landing
Discovery landed on runway 15 at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) on February 11, 1995
(day 42). Ten videos of the Orbiter approach and landing were received. NASA Select, a
composite created from the available landing views, was also screened.
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Event Description
Landing gear doors opened
Left main gear touchdown
Right main gear touchdown
Nose wheel touchdown
Wheel stop
Table 1.1.3
Timing
_m
11:50:03.550 UTC
11:50:19.054 UTC
11:50:19.188 UTC
11:50:32.835 UTC
11:51:39.703 UTC
Landing Event Times
Camera
EL17
KTV33L
KTV33L
KTV33L
KTV11L
A continuous black streak across several tiles was visible at the starboard base of the
vertical stabilizer during the post-landing walk-around video inspection. Subsequent
communication with inspectors at KSC and engineers at JSC has indicated that this streak
was caused when densification slurry used in the launch pad repair of a vertical stabilizer
leading edge tile had dripped aft across white AFRSI blankets.
The following additional items were noted during the post landing walk around: Tile
damage on the base heat shield between SSME #2 and #3, frayed Dome Mounted Heat
Shield (DMHS) close-out blankets on SSME #1 and #2, orange discoloration near the
forward/starboard RCS area, and possible discoloration on the upper side of the body
flap.
1.2 TIMING ACTIVITIES
All launch videos had timing and launch film cameras El, E2, E3, E4, E5, E6, E7, E8,
E9, El0, E11, El2, El3, El4, El5, El6, El7, El8, El9, E20, E25, E26, E52, E54, E59,
E79A had in-frame alphanumeric timing (film cameras E222 and E224 had in-frame
alphanumeric timing that was incorrect). These videos and films were used to time
specific mission events during the initial screening. The following additional events were
timed on two film cameras:
(_amera ...... Frame Comments
Recffchlation start
Timing (UTC)
34:05:23:34.506E205 4449 .
5667 Recirculation end 34:05:23:52.068
6839 SRB Separation 34:05:24:08.993
"E207 5662 .... Recirculation start 34:05:23:35.467
6300 "" Recirculation end 34:05:23:46.003
7695 SRB Separation 34:05:24:09.021
Table 1.2 Film Camera Timing Events
V
V
V
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2.1
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS ANALYSIS
DEBRIS
Debris near the Time of SSME Ignition
LH2 and LO2 Tail Service Mast (TSM) T- 0 Umbilical Disconnect
Debris
(Cameras E17, E18, E19, E20, E77, 0TV149, OTV150, OTV151)
Normal ice debris was noted falling from the LH2 and LO2 TSM T-0 umbilical
disconnect areas at SSME ignition through lift,ft. None of the debris was observed to
strike the vehicle. No follow-up action was requested.
2.1.1.2 LH2 and LO2 ET/Orbiter Umbilical Disconnect Debris
(Cameras El, ES, E6, E9, E12, E26, E30, E31, E34, E40, E52, E60,
OTVI09, OTV154, OTV163)
Normal ice debris was noted falling from the LH2 and LO2 ET/Orbiter umbilical
disconnect areas at SSME ignition through liftoff. Multiple pieces of light colored debris
(probably ice) were seen striking the LH2 umbilical sill and the 4 inch recirculation line
during SSME startup (as seen on OTV109). No damage to the SLV was apparent in
either case. No follow-up action was requested.
2.1.2 Debris near the Time of SRB Ignition
2.1.2.1 Holddown Post Debris
(Camera El3)
A single piece of dark debris was seen near the forward end on the LSRB holddown post
M-6 debris containment system (DCS) at SRB ignition. No follow-up action was
requested.
2.1.2.2 SRB Flame Duct Debris
(Cameras E4, E7, E8, E9, Ell, E12, E13, El4, E15, E16, E52)
As on previous missions, several pieces of debris were noted originating from the SRB
flame duct area after SRB ignition. The majority of this debris was seen near the
holddown posts. Several light colored pieces of debris were seen on the north side of the
launch vehicle just after liftoff (05:22:05.322 UTC) which were possibly from the flame
duct. None of the SRB flame duct debris was seen to contact the vehicle. No foil.w-up
action was requested.
2.1.2.3 Debris between Orbiter and ET between Lifloff and Tower Clear
(Camera E34, E54)
Multiple pieces of light colored debris were seen falling aft between the Orbiter and the
external tank between liftoff and tower clear. The debris pieces appeared to originate
from the forward bellows area of the external tank LO2 feedline. One piece of debris
appeared to contact the tiles on the underside of the Orbiter. No damage to the launch
vehicle was visible on the available views. No follow-up action was requested.
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2.1.3 Debris after Liftoff
(Cameras E40, E52, E207, E212, E213, E220, E222, E223, E224, ET207)
Multiple pieces of debris were seen falling aft of the Shuttle Launch Vehicle (SLV)
between tower clear and early ascent on the launch tracking views. Most of the debris
sightings were probably reaction control system (RCS) paper or ice from the ET/Orbiter
umbilicals. None of the debris was observed to strike the vehicle. No follow-up action
was requested.
2.1.3.1 Debris along SRB Plume During Ascent
(Cameras E208, E218, ET208, KTV4B)
Multiple pieces of light colored debris were seen falling aft of the vehicle along the SRB
plume between 59 and 72 seconds MET and again, a few seconds prior to SRB
separation. Debris in these time periods has been seen on previous missions. No follow-
up action was requested.
Figure 2.1.3.1 Debris Falls along SRB Plume during Ascent (KTV4B)
2.1.3.2 Debris Reported by the Crew (Task #10)
The crew debris report was not transcribed for STS-63.
STS-63 JSC Summary Report
ORIGINAL PAGE
COLOR PHOTOGRAPH
A-9
VV'-'
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2.2 MLP EVENTS
2.2.1 Orange Vapor (Possibly Free-burning Hydrogen)
(Cameras E62, E76, E77, OTVi63, OTV170, OTVI7I)
Orange vapor (possibly free-burning hydrogen) was seen above the aft end of the right
OMS pod near the base of the vertical stabilizer and under the body flap during SSME
ignition. This event has been noted on past missions and would become a concern if the
vapor was near the ET/Orbiter umbilicals. On this mission the vapor was below the
umbilicals and no follow-up action was requested.
Figure 2.2.1 Orange Vapor near the Vertical Stabilizer during SSME Ignition
(OTV171)
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2.2.2 Base Heat Shield Erosion
(Cameras E17, E20)
A small area of base heat shield erosion was seen to form outboard of SSME # 3 at
05:22:00.995 UTC on camera El7. TPS erosion was seen on the base of the left RCS
stinger at 05:22:00.741 UTC on camera E20. Base heat shield erosion has been seen on
previous missions. No follow-up action was requested.
KT-7
Figure 2.2.2 Base Heat Shield Erosion Outboard of SSME #3 (El7)
2.2.3 Orange Flashes in SSME Plume
(Cameras El, E2, E5, E19)
As on previous missions, several orange flashes were noted in the SS_ exhaust plume
during SSME ignition. The orange flashes are probably caused by RCS paper debris
detaching and falling into the SSME plumes. No follow-up action was requested.
2.2.4 Loose Thermal Curtain Tape
(Cameras E2, E5, E8, E9, E25, E77)
A loose piece of thermal curtain tape was seen on the RSRB aft skirt near holddown post
M-2 at liftoff. Loose SRB thermal curtain tape has been seen on previous missions. No
follow-up action was requested.
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2.2.5 Pyro Initiator Controller (PIC) Wire Remained Attached to Shoe
(Cameras EIO, E13)
Two Pyro Initiator Controller (PIC) wires remained attached to the holddown post foot
after the foot had cleared the holddown post (HDP) shoe at liftoff. One wire was on the
RSRB HDP M-3 and the other wire was on the LSRB HDP M-6. This event has been
observed on previous missions and is not considered anomalous.
2.2.6 Flexing of the Base Heat Shield
(Cameras E20, E76, E77)
A slight flexing of the Orbiter base heat shield was noted at SSME ignition. Flexing of
the base heat shield has been seen on previous missions. No follow-up action was
requested.
2.2.7 White Flashes in SSME Plume
(Cameras E52, E218, E224)
White flashes were noted in the SSME plume during early ascent. White flashes in the
SSME exhaust plume have been seen on previous missions. No follow-up action was
requested.
2.3 ASCENT EVENTS
2.3.1 Body Flap Motion (Task #4)
(Cameras El7, El8, E207, ET207)
2.3.1.1 Body Flap Motion on the Pad
A continuing historical analysis of OV-103 missions is the driver for studying body flap
motion seen on the pad. A subjective comparison between this mission and others
since reflight indicated only slight on-pad motion on STS-63. The time of maximum
on-pad motion was determined to lie just after SSME ignition. Points defining the aft
port and starboard edges of the body flap were chosen on every fourth frame over a
period of 400 frames on cameras El7 and El8. This corresponded to approximately 1
second of actual data. In addition, a control point on the tail service mast (TSM) was
chosen to serve as a control for camera motion. Body flap thickness (assumed to lie in
the plane of motion) was used as the scaling factor for this analysis. The maximum
peak-to-peak motion measured approximately 1.0 inches on starboard side and 0.7
inches on port side.
A frequency-domain analysis was conducted to identify modes of vibration. The data
revealed the existence of several specific modes of vibration. Analysis indicated
frequency peaks at 3, 7.5, 9, 12.5, 17, 27, 36.5 and 48 hertz for the starboard side; and
5, 7.5, 9, 11.5, 17, 20, 23.5 and 40.5 hertz for the port side. Of these peaks, global
rotation (9 hertz) could be correlated with an identifiable mode on both sides and a
second bending moment (40.5 hertz) was identified on the port side of the flap. The
significance of the presence of these modes depends upon the results of long-term trend
analysis.
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2.3.1.2 Body Flap Motion During Ascent
Film from camera E207 was reviewed for body flap motion visible during ascent. While
body flap motion was seen on this mission, measurements indicated that the data
appeared to lie within the noise. This event has been tracked on all missions since
reflight. Deflection measurements did not indicate measurable motion.
2.3.2 White Streak at Base of Vertical Stabilizer
(Cameras E205, E207, E222, E223, ET207)
A white streak was noted at the base of the vertical stabilizer at approximately 43 seconds
MET. The event resembled a streak previously seen on STS-68 near the right OMS pod
at 36 seconds MET. On STS-68, damage to the right OMS pod was detected during the
post mission inspection. No damage was detected during the STS-63 post mission
inspection. No follow-up action was requested.
Figure 2.3.2 A White Streak at the Base of the Vertical Stabilizer at 43 Seconds MET
(E223)
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2.3.3 Linear Optical Effect
(Cameras E207, E208, E223, ET207, ET208, KTV13)
Multiple linear optical effects were seen between 68 and 98 seconds MET. Engineers at
JSC have previously attributed this event to the manifestation of shock waves around the
SLV. No follow-up action was requested.
2.3.4 Recirculation
(Cameras E205, E207)
The recirculation or expansion of burning gases at the aft end of the Shuttle Launch
Vehicle (SLV) prior to SRB separation has been seen on nearly all previous missions.
Recirculation on this mission was observed between approximately 93 and 103 seconds
MET on camera E207.
2.3.5 Orange Flashes in SRB Plume prior to SRB Separation
(Camera E207)
Multiple orange flashes were noted in the SRB plume prior to SRB separation. This
event has been noted on previous missions. Previous consultation with JSC engineers
indicated that the flashes resulted from the natural irregularity of the plume which
produced different shadings in different regions. No follow-up action was requested.
2.3.6 Large Flare One second prior to SRB Separation
(Camera ET207)
The view from video camera ET207 showed a large orange flare separating from the
Orbiter image approximately one second prior to SRB separation. This event was not
visible on any other available video or film views. The event was possibly caused by the
viewing angle and the interaction of the atmosphere and shock waves. No follow-up
action was requested.
2.4 ONBOARD PHOTOGRAPHY OF THE ET (DTO-312)
2.4.1 Analysis of Handheld Photography of the ET (Task #6)
DTO-312 photography of the STS-63 external tank was not performed on this mission
due to darkness.
2.4.2 Umbilical Well Camera Analysis (Task #5)
The umbilical well cameras were not flown on the STS-63 mission (OV-103 is not
configured for umbilical well cameras).
2.5 ON-ORBIT EVENTS
2.5.1 Orbital DEbris RAdar Calibration Spheres (ODERACS) Support
(Task #14)
The Image Science & Analysis Group (IS&AG) supported the ODERACS deployment.
Analysts calculated exit velocities of three calibration spheres and three dipoles launched
from a Get-Away-Special Can located in the aft section of the cargo bay. These
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calculated velocities ranged from 1.44 to 3.66 meters per second and were used to help
radar sites around the world track the spheres and dipoles. (See the accompanying table
for actual velocities.
SEQ.
1
2
3
4
5
6
DESCR.
white sphere
II'_ d,,o,eII
DIA. EXP. VELOC. CALC. VELOC -EJECT.TIME
(inches) /meters/sec.) (metersYsec. / (min:sec)UTC
4.0 3.39 3.66 57:04.8
po,isho=s,h.,oll2O 213
II,740"di_,eII
II 192 II 57:O9.7
,85 II 197 II 57:12.2
black sphere 6.0 1.61
1.405.255" dipole
1.52 57:17.5
1.44 57:20.0
Table 2.5.1 Expected/Calculated Velocity and Ejection Times of the Six
Projectiles of the ODERACS Flight Experiment.
Tumbling of the dipoles was visible on the downlinked payload bay camera 'D' views.
The six projectiles were visible. The three objects which were constantly visible were
identified as the spheres. The three objects which appeared to be blinking were identified
as the dipoles. The distinction between specific spheres or specific dipoles was not
possible. The rotation rates of the three dipoles was determined by analysis of the rate of
blinking. The rotation rates of the dipoles were 0.167, 0.286 and 0.437 cycles per
second.
7
Figure 2.5.1 ODERACS Deployment
The picture on the !eft is a composite image created by merging six different video
frames. This image depicts the three spheres and three dipoles as they clear the IMAX
payload in the aft section of the cargo bay as seen from camera B. The composite image
on the right shows these objects several minutes after deploy as seen from camera D.
Velocities of these objects were calculated and forwarded to the Orbital Debris personnel
in near real time (within 30 minutes of deploy).
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2.5.2 Reaction Control System RIU Jet Leak Characterization (Task #15)
At the request of the MER Manager, the Image Science & Analysis Group conducted an
analysis of Shuttle video downlink to estimate the size and velocity of nitrogen tetroxide
particles ("snowballs") leaking from the RIU RCS thruster. A similar analysis was
conducted on the R4U leak on STS-42. The available STS-63 video sequence ran from
approximately 2:54:50 UTC to 3:05:00 UTC on February 4, 1995 (day 35).
The largest particle seen while the vertical stabilizer was in the field of view was
estimated to be approximately 13 inches in diameter (at 03:01:40.428 UTC). However,
the blooming of the video from the MLA camera in position D causes distortions that
increase the apparent size of the particle. By way of comparison, a piece of downlink
video taken from a different camera and available at a later time was analyzed. This
video (with less distortion due to video blooming) showed a greatly reduced leak rate,
with the largest particle being approximately 8 inches in size.
The most accurate values of velocity (though perhaps not the highest values) occurred at
the edge of the leak dispersion cone since, at that point, there is only one plane of motion
relative to the filed of view. During one of the bursts of oxidizer from the R IU jet, the
maximum velocity was estimated to be 13.5 feet per second (reference time 03:01:43:459
UTC).
The accuracy of the analysis was hampered by the quality of the video, the amount of
time the camera was held in a fixed position, and the amount of fixed hardware (i.e., the
Orbiter) in the field of view. Blooming of the MLA payload bay camera view of the
vertical stabilizer made it difficult to define scaling points. In addition, in some cases, it
was difficult to distinguish lights from cities on the Earth from the oxidizer snowballs in
the foreground during night passes.
Figure 2.5.2 Exit Cone of RCS R1U Jet Leak near Vertical Stabilizer
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2.5.3 Waste Water Purge Investigation
The IS&AG provided suggestions for viewing angle and lighting conditions for acquiring
video of the waste water purge process at the request of the Life Support Systems
Branch/EC3. This investigation attempted to replicate the conditions on STS-66 when
ice buildup was noted on a cargo bay door. The problem encountered in previous video
acquisitions was poor contrast due the white Orbiter surface in the background and
inadequate lighting. The IS&AG suggested orienting the camera to acquire a dark
background and coordinating the investigation with daylight and back]it conditions.
Shuttle orientation and attitude requirements prevented using the sun as a backlighting
source. Unfortunately, the resulting output data did not provide enough information to
perform useful analysis.
2.6 LANDING EVENTS
2.6.1 Landing Sink Rate Analysis (Task #3)
The sink rate of the Orbiter was determined over a one second interval prior to main gear
and nose gear touchdown. The measured main gear and nose gear sink rate values were
below the maximum allowables of 9.6 feet per second for a 211,000 lb vehicle and 6.0
feet per second for a 240,000 lb. vehicle (the landing weight of the Orbiter was 224,130
Ib).
2.6.1.1 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Film (Task #3)
Film camera EL7 was used to determine the landing sink rate of the main gear. The
analysis considered approximately one second of imagery immediately prior to
touchdown. Data was gathered at a sample rate of 100 frames per second. An
assumption was made that the line of sight of the camera was perpendicular to the Orbiter
y-axis. Scaling information was determined by using the distance between the main gear
struts. The vertical difference of the projected main gear point for two successive frames
was multiplied by the scaling factor to find the change in height of the main gear over
that interval. The main gear height above the runway was determined by assigning the
frame of touchdown a height of 0 feet, and cumulatively adding the previous frames.
These heights were then regressed with respect to time. Sink rate equals the slope of this
regression line. The main gear sink rate was determined to be 3.75 feet per second.
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STS-63 main gear sink rate using film
(camera EL-7)
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Figure 2.6.1.1 (a) Graph of Main Gear Height Versus Time Prior to Touchdown (Film)
Film camera EL9 was used to determine the landing sink rate of the nose gear. The
analysis considered approximately one second of imagery immediately prior to
touchdown. Data was gathered at a Sample rata of 100 frames p6_ _ecofid. _ _: ' '
assumption was made that the line of sight of the camera was perpendicular to the Orbiter
y-axis. Scaling information was determined by using the distance between the main gear
struts. The vertical difference of the digitized nose gear point from the average of the
main gear points was multiplied by the scaling factor to find the height of the nose gear
for a single frame. An empirical offset correction was made to produce a calculated
height at main gear touchdown of 0 feet. These heights were then regressed with respect
to time. Sink rate equals the slope of this regression line. The nose gear sink rate was
determined to be 3.20 feet per second.
V
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Figure 2.6.1.1 (b) Graph of Nose Gear Height Versus Time during Rollout (Film)
2.6.1.2 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Video
(Cameras SLF North and SLF South)
Video camera SLF North was also used to determine the landing sink rate of the main
gear. Data was gathered at a sample rate of 30 frames per second. The main gear sink rate
was determined to be 3.68 feet per second.
3.5
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0.5
0"01
-0.5
STS-63 main gear sink rate using video
3.6s wse_ (camera SLF-North)
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,...,......0.25see ]
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Figure 2.6.1.2 (a)
Time relative to touchdown (seconds)
Graph of Right Main Gear Height Versus Time prior to Touchdown (Video)
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Video camera KTV33L was also used to determine the landing sink rate of the nose gear.
Data was gathered at a sample rate of 30 frames per second. The nose gear sink rate was
determined to be 3.63 feet per second.
V
STS-63 nose gear sink rate using video
(camera KTV-33L)
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Figure 2.6.1.2 (b) Graph of Nose Gear Height Versus Time during Rollout (Video)
2.6.2 Drag Chute Performance (Task #9)
The peH'ormance of the drag chute during roll-out of STS-63 appeared normal. The drag
chute has been taken off Detailed Test Objective (DTO) status beginning with STS-63.
For future mission, the drag chute angular orientation will only be measured upon special
request.
Event Description
Drag chute initiation
Camera
Chute release
KTV33L
Pilot chute at full inflation KTV 15L
Bag release KTV 15L
Drag chute inflation in reefed KTV33L
configuration
Drag chute inflation in disreefed KTV33L
configuration
KTV11L
Timing
11:50:26.628 UTC
ill,
11:50:27.360 UTC
11:50:28.094 UTC
11:50:29.331 UTC
11:50:32.434 UTC
11:51:05.035 UTC
Drag Chute Event TimesTable 2.6.2
-----height
_1 0 sec
----.---0.5 see
i----..0.25
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2.6.3 Orbiter Height above Threshold (Task #13)
The still camera designated for the height above threshold analysis was not operated.
Therefore, this analysis will not be completed for the STS-63 mission.
_J
2.7 OTHER NORMAL EVENTS
Other normal events observed include: normal SSME ignition sequence, body flap
vibration after SSME ignition, ET twang prior to liftoff, right and left inboard and
outboard elevon vibration after SSME ignition and at liftoff, RCS paper debris after
SSME ignition, multiple pieces of white debris (probably ice from the ET/Orbiter
umbilicals) fell along the body flap after liftoff, ice and vapor from the GUCP area
during ET GH2 umbilical vent arm retraction, vapors from the ET gaseous hydrogen
umbilical disconnect during early liftoff, multiple pieces of dark debris in the exhaust
cloud after liftoff, acoustic waves in the SRB exhaust plume after liftoff, multiple pieces
of light colored debris noted aft of the SLV during early ascent, vapor from both SRB
stiffener rings after liftoff, ET aft dome outgassing, charring of the ET aft dome, flares in
the SSME exhaust plume after the roll maneuver, dark puffs in SRB exhaust plume prior
to SRB plume brightening, SRB plume brightening prior to SRB separation, SRB
separation, and slag in the SRB exhaust plume after SRB separation.
Normal pad events observed were hydrogen ignitor operation, fixed service structure
(FSS) deluge water spray activation, sound suppression water operation, a leak in a
Mobile Launch Platform (MLP) J-pipe, multiple pieces of light colored debris falling
from the Fixed Service Structure (FSS) during SSME ignition, and MLP deluge water
operation.
2.8 OTHER
2.8.1 Terminal Events Timing Interval (Task #11)
A detailed timeline of the SSME and SRB ignition sequences was generated and sent to
R. Fletcher/VF5.
I I lit • I
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I. INTRODUCTION
The launch of space shuttle mission STS-63, the twentieth
flight of the Orbiter Discovery occurred on February 2, 1995, at
approximately 11:22 P.M. Central Standard Time from Launch
Complex 39B (LC-39B), Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida.
Extensive photographic and video coverage exists and has been
evaluated to determine proper operation of the ground and flight
hardware. Cameras (video and cine) providing this coverage are
located on the fixed service structure (FSS), mobile launch
platform (MLP), LC-39B perimeter sites, onboard the vehicle, and
uprange and downrange tracking sites.
J
II. ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OBJECTIVES:
The planned engineering photographic and video analysis
objectives for STS-63 included, but were not limited to the
following:
a. Overall facility and shuttle vehicle coverage for
anomaly detection
b. Verification of cameras, lighting and timing systems
c. Determination of SRB PIC firing time and SRB
separation time
d. Verification of Thermal Protection System (TPS)
integrity
e. Correct operation of the following:
I. Holddown post blast covers
2. SSME ignition
3. LH2 and LO2 17" disconnects
4. GH2 umbilical
5. TSM carrier plate umbilicals
6. Free hydrogen ignitors
7. Vehicle clearances
8. GH2 vent line retraction and latch back
9. Vehicle motion
III. CAMERA COVERAGE ASSESSMENT:
Film was received from fifty of fifty-two requested
cameras as well as video from twenty-four of twenty-four
requested cameras. The following table illustrates the camera
data received at MSFC for STS-63.
kj
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Camera data received at MSFC
for STS-63
MLP
FSS
Perimeter
Tracking
Onboard
16mm 35mm Video
22 0 4
6 0 3
3 4 6
0 15 11
0 0 0
Totals 31 19 24
Total number of films and videos receive 74
i!i_i_ii!ii!i_i_i!i_!_ii!ii_!H_El1_!_ii!_i_!!i_!__i_:__i_iiiiiii_iiiiiiii!_iii_iiiii_ii_iiiii_iiii_!!!i!!i!!ill
a. Ground Camera Coverage:
All requested video cameras and film cameras operated
properly except for items E-36 which experienced an obstruction
in its field-of-view and E-57 which had a film jam at startup.
No timing information was recorded from the KSC replays of the
long range tracking cameras. The remote tracking of the
perimeter cameras appeared to be excellent. Due to the night
launch, all film and video products provided reduced
information. None of the forward portion of the vehicle was
visible after liftoff from the pad.
b. Onboard Camera Coverage:
No onboard film is expected. There were no umbilical
cameras onboard this mission and the DTO to photograph the ET
after separation was not planned to be performed because of RCS
fuel limitations.
IV. ANOMALIES/OBSERVATIONS:
No anomalies were observed. However, several observations
were made. Normal vehicle events which occur during launch that
were observed include: GH2 vent arm retraction, RCS paper
B-5
\debris from the orbiter, elevon motion at liftoff, acoustic
waves in the SRB exhaust plume at liftoff, vapor from the SRB
stiffener rings after liftoff, ET aft dome outgassing, liner
optical effects after the roll maneuver, flow recirculation, and
SRB plume brightening prior to SRB separation.
Normal pad events which occur during launch are free
hydrogen ignitor operation, sound suppression water operation,
and MLP and FSS deluge water operation.
Orange vapors from the burning free hydrogen were noted
during the SSME startup sequence near the base of the right OMS
pod. This burning is shown in Figure 1 which was taken from
camera OTV-170. These type vapors have been seen in this region
before and their location appears to be influenced by the local
wind conditions. No burning of the vehicle surfaces was
observed.
Figure 1 Free burning hydrogen rising to base of right OMS pod
Ice/frost was observed falling from the 17 inch disconnects
as well as the LH2 recirculation and feedline bellows and the
ET/orbiter attach struts during ignition and liftoff. Also a
piece of debris fell from near the left ET/orbiter attach point
at liftoff. Ice/frost was observed falling from the forward LOX
feedline bellows during liftoff. One piece impacted the right
wind and broke into two small pieces as shown in Figure 2. No
damage to the vehicle was observed.
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Figure 2 Ice from the forward LOX feedline bellows
Frost was observed around the ME-2 eyelid at liftoff.
Figure 3 is a picture from camera E-18 of this frost.
J
Figure 3 Frost around ME-2 eyelid.
One piece of loose thermal curtain tape was noted near
holddown post M-2. Figure 4 shows this tape at liftoff as seen
from camera E-8.
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Figure 4 Loose thermal curtain tape on right SRB
Several (greater than 8) flat pieces of debris exited the SRB
blast hole at post M-4 during SRM ignition. Examples of this
debris from camera E-7 are shown in Figure 5. None of these
particles impacted the vehicle.
Figure 5 Debris from SRB blast hole
Several streaks were observed in the SSME plumes. A streak was
observed in the ME-1 plume prior to liftoff at 05:22:03.358 as
shown in Figure 6 and in the ME-2 plume at 05:22:05.319 as shown
in Figure 7. There was a streak noted in the ME-1 plume during
ascent at 05:42:41.305.
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rFigure 6 Streak in ME-1
!
Figure 7 Streak in ME-2
What appears to be a vapor trail or debris streak was
noted at approximately T+43 seconds MET between the base of the
vertical stabilizer and the right OMS pod. This event is shown
in Figure 8 which was taken from camera E-207. The source of
these vapors is unknown since they only become visible when near
the SSME plumes.
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Figure 8 Vapors passing between vertical stabilizer and OMS pod
Figure 9 depicts only two glowing debris particles of several
observed being ejected from the SRM plume during ascent at T+59
seconds to T+80 seconds MET from camera TV-4B. These type
particles were also observed during the SRB separation event.
Figure 9 Glowing debris particles ejected from SRB plume
Figure I0 depicts a wire that was attached to the RSS
checkout coax connector of the intertank. This wire remained
attached while it was in the camera's field of view. This was
noted from camera E-33.
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Figure i0 Wire from RSS checkout coax connector on intertank
V. ENGINEERING DATA RESULTS:
a. T-Zero Times:
T-Zero times are determined from cameras that view the SRB
holddown posts numbers M-l, M-2, M-5 and M-6. These cameras
record the explosive bolt combustion products.
HOLDDOWN POST CAMERA POSITION TIME (UTC)
M-I E-9 05:22:04.002
M-2 E-8 05:22:04.002
M-5 E-12 05:22:04.003
M-6 E-13 05:22:04.003
b. ET Tip Deflection:
Maximum ET tip deflection for this mission was determined
to be approximately 31 inches. Figure ii is a data plot showing
the measured motion of the ET tip in both the horizontal and
vertical directions. A positive horizontal displacement
represents motion in the -Z direction. These data were derived
from film camera E-79A.
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Figure Ii ET Tip Deflection
c. SRB Separation Time:
SRB separation time for STS-63 was determined to be
034:05:24:09.03 UTC as recorded by several tracking cameras.
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